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The decision maker is likely to favor the piograms with reliable rather than laigely speculative estimates of antic¬ipated accomplishments per dollar. Second, if a new piogram requires asubstantial initial commitment of funds but the year-to-year increment offresh funds for an agency may never be that large, the tendency will beto expand existing programs rather than to innovate. Third, additionalexpenditure on a project under way (e.g., a dam or building) whose costsare now seen as likely to exceed its benefits may be preferred to a pro¬posed new project with a very favorable benefit-cost ratio. The decisionalquestion is whether die additional expenditure for completion (not thetotal project costs) will be less than total project benefits, to which theanswer is usually affirmative. The already "sunk costs" reinforce the case,since they will usually be a total loss if the project is abandoned.The Basic Model AppraisedThe basic rational-analysis model presents a number of problems.Note first that of the four steps, only two—the identification of alterna¬tives and the calculation and comparison of benefits and costs—call forrational analysis. The first step, the clear, operational statement of thegoal or objective, is a/prerequisite of rational analysis. The statement mustcome from someone outside the process itself (e.g., Congress, the Presi¬dent, an agency head). The last step, decision in favor of the bestalternative, is essentially a "programmed" decision in our sketch of theprocess. It follows automatically from the analysts' identification ofalternatives and indication of which has the best ratio of benefits to costs.Only a much watered-down version of the model leaves the decisionmaker free to consider other factors than those furnished by rationalanalysis.Goals. At least three problems beset the goal-statement issue: multiplegoals, redistributional goals, and sources of goal definitions. In our basicmodel we postulated a single operationally stated goal or objective. Yetmany governmental undertakings have multiple goals. This complicatesdevelopment of an operational statement, for a set of goals has sufficientexplicitness only if weights are assigned to the goals. Essentially, theanalyst needs to be told by what degree each goal may be sacrificed inorder to achieve more of each other goal. Nice reckoning of such trade¬offs is not within the capacity of most goal-setting olficials.If that is uncongenial to policy-level officials, redistributional goals areuncongenial to rational analysts. Yet many governmental programs seekto redistribute benefits among regions, classes, and other social groups.Because the rational-analysis approach was developed principally by economists, it tends to measure the effectiveness of projects and programsby their contribution to increasmg the national income. This goal ofnational efficiency, defined in economic terms, displaces or downgradesredistributional and other noneconomic objectives. As a less parochialeconomist puts it, "It is very likely that education of the hard-coreunemployed may make less of a contribution to national income thaneducation of professionals at universities. Yet we are willing to devoteresources to training the hard-core unemployed because of the need toachieve political stability."®hideed, rational economic analysis tends to a bias against the redistri¬bution objective. In the ordinary free market, the value of a commodityor service is what people are willing to pay for it; this expression ofconsumer preference incorporates their measure of its benefit to them.Much rational analysis in government is a search for an equivalentpricing indicator of the benefit of public projects and programs tocitizens. The best guide, of course, is furnished when the governmentsells its services at prices that cover the costs. Hence, some economicanalysts urge that the government fix an economically sound charge forvacationers' use of campgrounds in the national parks and forests.� Thenumber of campers and their length of stay would then reveal the dollarvalue people attach to the service. Yet such a user charge, howeverconvenient for economists, would subvert the redistributional purpose ofenabling less affluent citizens to enjoy our national parks and forests.Because goal setting in the pure model is outside the analytical processproper, the classic literature on rational decision making has litde to sayabout who sets goals. Instead, a decision maker is hypothesized who ispresumed able to define an objective in the precise, operational formneeded for analysts to proceed with their tasks. Yet we know thatCongress's statements of objectives often lack clarity and consistency, thatthe President's assertion of comprehensive goal-setting responsibilitywould be contested by Congress, and that an agency head rarely hassuch complete jurisdiction over a major policy area as to be conceded thegoal-setting role by heads of other agencies active in the area.Some think that a nation should formulate goals for five, ten, ortwenty years ahead and restrict debate thereafter to the best means forattaining the goals. But our elaborately pluralistic political system is designed to be constandy formulating and reformulating goals as politicalmajorities shift, the effectiveness of various interest groups waxes andw�anes, population changes, and new technologies and new informationalter the shape of problems and our capacity to deal with them. The artof assembling majorities, both electoral and legislative, includes vagueidentificadon of goals and flexibility in accommodation of others" ideasand preferred language. The system is not tidy. It violates the belief thata ship, even a ship of state, may go in circles if it has no port ofdestination. But the constitutional separation of powers, political realities,bureaucratic dynamics, and rapidity of change in world and domesticconditions afford little prospect of success in the search for an authori¬tative fixer of stable, operationally stated goals.The goal-definition problem can be transformed by proposing, assome writers do, that the analyst formulate the goal or at least contributevigorously to its clarification.® The first proposed role simply revives theold issue of whether major governmental choices of direction should bemade by "experts" or by responsible policy-level officials. The secondrole—offering of bright ideas that may change a decision makersthinking about an objective—is open to all who have access to the decisionmaker; it is neither a monopoly nor a special skill of systems analysts.Identification of Alternatives. In our outline of the basic model we havereferred ambiguously to "identification of alternative ways of achievingthe goal." The pure model of rationality requires that a// such alternativesbe identified. This requirement needs to be greatiy relaxed, both becauseour wit is unequal to the task of so complete a search of the possibilities(and, indeed, is unable to know when the search has discovered everypossibility), and because the "cost" (in time and energy, as well as money)of a comprehensive search is too high. In real life people tend to followtwo search behaviors: (1) they simplify by screening out all silly alterna¬tives and by restricting themselves to a few major alternatives (instead ofmultiplying them by giving separate status to each minor variation); and(2) they stop searching when they come upon a satisfactory alternative,even though further search might turn up a better one. The latterbehavior has been termed "satisficing" by James March and HerbertSimon.® This welcome realism does not carry us very far, for the critical question then becomes: What standards will be used to determinesatisfactoriness? If this, or the process for defining standards, is leftvague, little science remains in "the science of i-ational decision making."Costs-and-benefits Calculation. Rational-analysis proponents may treatgoals as not their responsibility, and identification of alternatives, thoughtheir job, as a matter of imagination and judgment in the search proc¬ess. It is in the calculation of costs and benefits of the several alternativesthat their technical competence is most substantially brought into play.And it is here that the approach has made the greatest contribution.Yet there are problems of moment even in this area. Some of themare implicit in our earlier discussion. First, given a goal or a set of closelyrelated goals, should only those costs and benefits be calculated that bearon that goal or set? Or should spillover effects on other goals (includingthose of other agencies' programs) be included in the reckoning? Evenif the answer supports the second procedure, how far should suchanalysis go in view of the "all-togetherness of everything,"' which makesany significant decision have almost infinite repercussions?Second, granted that costs and benefits may not all be expressed indollars in the real world, can qualitative deprivations and enhancementsbe converted into dollar terms or some other quantitative form thatpermits benefit-cost ratios to combine the real-world qualitative andquantitative factors? How much worth should be accorded a life, a child'shappiness, a scenic view from the highway, or a pleasing architecturaldesign? Somehow these and the lesser concerns do "count," perhapsespecially in America. Lewis M. Branscomb writes,Despite the well-publicized conflict between economic and ecological inter¬ests, our appreciation for environmental impact and technology assessmentis unique in the world. Where else would (i) a $600-million hydroelectricdam be held up to protect an endangered 3-inch freshwater fish called thesnail darter, (ii) a unique butterfly enjoy priority at the end of the mainrunway of the Los Angeles International Airport, and (iii) the sexual
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