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makes it analytically possible -- when disaggregating the Cold War SoutheastAsian security complex -- to identify two core sub-complexes. One is a maritimecore sub-complex whose “members” during the period under review shared aconvergence of political outlook. This core sub-complex comprises Indonesia,Malaysia and Singapore (and Brunei, as will be argued). The other core sub-complexis the continental (or mainland) core in which a convergence of political outlookamong regional states did not exist during the period under review. Thailand as thesole ASEAN “member” of this sub-complex, was able to draw on its politicalsolidarity with the other ASEAN members.With the several points above in mind, Alagappa's five security complexes --alternatively called sub-complexes (or clusters) with no difference in meaning -- willbe used for this study:12(1) the maritime core (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei)(2) the continental (or mainland) core (Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia)(3) the Thai-Burmese (Thai-Myanmarese) complex(4) the Thai-Malaysian complex(5) the Malaysia-Philippine-Indonesian complexFinally, disaggregation of the security complex after 1967 is important because itwill help identify the varying intensity of patterns of conflict and cooperation acrossdifferent issue areas.3.5The maritime coreThis sub-complex comprising Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (and, after 1984,Brunei) exhibits patterns of security interdependence which are primarily the resultof recent history, geography and political economy. Within this sub-complex, there isa triangular relationship among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore; and a bilateralrelationship between Malaysia and Singapore due to their common colonial ties and
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