the audit committee should improve the quality of information available
to investors. Prior research supports this notion by showing that
the financial expertise of the audit committee is significantly associated
with a lower incidence of financial statement restatement (Abbott,
Parker, & Peters, 2004), a reduced likelihood of material weaknesses in
internal control reported during an auditor change (Krishnan, 2005), a
reduction in fraud (Farber, 2005), and lower expected rates of return
on pension plan assets (Comprix, Guo, Zhang, & Zhou, 2012).
The SEC initially proposed a stringent definition of financial expert,
which defined individuals as financial experts only if they had education
and experience in accounting or auditing (i.e. as a certified public accountant,
auditor, chief financial officer, financial controller or accounting officer).
In response to criticism that this definition was overly restrictive,
the SEC adopted a broader definition of audit committee financial expert.
Specifically, an audit committeemember could be deemed a financial expert
if themember has hadwork experience in accounting or auditing, as
well as work experience in finance positions or as a chief executive officer
(CEO) or company president. Therefore, financial expertise may include
expertise in accounting, finance, or in supervising the preparation
of financial statements (supervisory expertise). However, many argue
that the current definition of financial expertise may be too broad and
lack the ability to ensure high financial reporting quality.
Consistent with this, prior research finds that the presence of accounting
financial expertise (but not non-accounting financial expertise)
on the audit committee is associated with certain financial reporting
characteristics such as greater accounting conservatism (Krishnan &
Visvanathan, 2008), higher quality accruals (Dhaliwal et al., 2010), and
lower earnings management (Bédard, Chtourou, & Courteau, 2004;
Carcello, Hollingsworth, & Neal, 2006). The accounting financial expertise
of the audit committee is also associated with a reduction in suspicious
auditor switches (Archambeault & DeZoort, 2001) and higher
firm credit ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & LaFond, 2006). Prior research
also suggests that investors care about the accounting financial
expertise of audit committee members. For example, DeFond et al.
(2005) find that companies appointing audit committee members with
accounting financial expertise experience significant positive abnormal
market returns, while nomarket reaction is observed upon the appointment
of those with non-accounting financial expertise.
Financial analysts use accounting information to formexpectations of
future earnings (e.g., Abarbanell & Bushee, 1997). Furthermore, survey
evidence suggests that audit committee financial expertise matters to financial
analysts. Dickins, Hillison, and Platau (2009) survey financial analysts
and find that analysts aremore confident in the financial statements
when the Audit Committee Financial Expert (ACFE) has accounting-based
financial expertise. However, there is little evidence on how financial analyst
earnings forecasts vary with audit committee financial expertise.
Thus, if audit committee accounting expertise increases both the quality
of financial information which financial analysts use to formulate their
forecasts and analyst confidence in the financial information provided,
we expect the properties of analysts' earnings forecasts to improve with
audit committee accounting expertise.
To address our research question, we examine the associations between
audit committee financial expertise and analyst earnings forecast
properties (i.e., accuracy and dispersion). Financial analysts are viewed
as sophisticated financial statement users and their earnings forecasts
are commonly used as a proxy for the market's expectation of earnings,
which is a critical element in firm valuation.We find that the accounting
financial expertise of the audit committee is significantly associated with
greater analyst forecast accuracy and lower forecast dispersion. In contrast,
examining the broad definition of financial expertise adopted by
the SEC, we find that non-accounting financial expertise is not significantly
associated with either improved analyst forecast accuracy or
lower analyst forecast dispersion.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First,
building on prior studies that examine the relation between audit committee
expertise and financial reporting quality, we examine whether
audit committee expertise is associatedwith improved analyst forecasts.
Our findings extend the literature by showing a link between accounting
expertise on the audit committee and forecasts of future earnings.
Our results also contribute to the debate on the definition of financial
expertise on an audit committee. Our evidence suggests that accounting
financial expertise (but not non-accounting financial expertise) enhances
financial analysts' ability to anticipate future earnings. In line with prior
research (Archambeault & DeZoort, 2001; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.,
2006; Bédard et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2006; Dhaliwal et al.,
2010; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008) these results suggest that accounting
specific financial expertise on the audit committee is especially
beneficial.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and
develops the hypotheses relating audit committee financial expertise to
the properties of analysts' forecasts. Section 3 describes the research
methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5
concludes the paper.
2. Prior research and hypotheses development
2.1. Audit committees and financial expertise
Prior studies using the broad definition of financial expertise have
providedmixed evidence about an association between financial expertise
and financial reporting quality. Abbott et al. (2004), and Agrawal
and Chadha (2005) find that financial expertise of the audit committee
(under a broad definition) is negatively related to the occurrence of restatement.
Farber (2005) also employs the broad definition of financial
expertise and finds a significantly lower occurrence of financial fraud
in firms with financial expertise on the audit committee. However,
Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004) employ the broad definition of
financial expertise and find no association between audit committee
financial expertise and cost of debt. Additionally, anecdotal evidence
suggests that financial expertise obtained through experience as a
CEO or president does not ensure an adequate understanding of accounting
matters for an audit committee member (Livingston, 2003).
Later studies adopt a narrower definition of financial expertise, similar
to the definition initially proposed by the SEC. This definition differentiates
between accounting and non-accounting financial expertise.
Such research has provided more consistent associations between accounting
financial expertise on the audit committee and financial
reporting quality. For instance, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) find
that firms with accounting financial experts on the audit committee
are associated with more conservative financial reporting. Dhaliwal et
al. (2010) finds a significant positive relation between accounting expertise
on audit committees and accruals quality. Additionally, research
has examinedwhether accounting financial expertise on the audit committee
affects stock prices. Both Davidson, Xie, and Xu (2004) and
DeFond et al. (2005) find that themarket rewards companies for the appointment
of accounting financial experts, but shows no reaction for the
appointment of audit committee members with corporate financial
management expertise. These studies clearly suggest that the market
discriminates between accounting and non-accounting financial expertise
on the audit committee.
2.2. Hypotheses development
An effective audit committee can enhance the credibility and reliability
of the financial statements provided to users. The SEC and the
Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) suggest that the primary responsibilities
of the audit committee include assessing accounting policies,
evaluating accounting judgment, appointing and overseeing external
auditors, and appraising the quality of the firm's financial reports.
Carcello et al. (2006) indicate that, while almost all companies disclose
whether an audit committee financial expert serves on the
audit committee, the majority of these designated financial experts
2 J.L. Abernathy et al. / Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting 29 (2013) 1–11